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A function and f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) is said to be t-private if there exists a (randomized) communication
protocol for computing f , such that no coalition of at most t participants can infer any additional
information from the execution of the protocol other than what follows from their inputs and the value
of f . It is known that every n-argument function f defined over finite domains can be computed
b n¡12 c-privately. The classes of 1-private two-argument functions and of t-private Boolean functions
admit relatively simple characterizations. In contrast, the general question of characterizing the class
of t-private functions of n arguments is still open. The only technique that appears in the literature
for proving non-t-privacy of a function f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) over a finite domain, where n ‚ 3 and
d n2 e • t • n ¡ 1, uses a reduction to the two-party case via a partition argument. A necessary
condition for f being t-private is that for every partition (S; ¯S) of the parties f1, 2, : : : , ng such that
both jSj • t and j ¯Sj • t , the two-argument function obtained by viewing f as a function of fxi gi2S
and fxi gi2 ¯S is 1-private. The question whether the use of such partition reductions together with the
two-party characterization is powerful enough to characterize privacy in the multiparty case was raised
as an open problem in previous works. These works also exhibit an affirmative answer for specific
classes of functions. We answer this question negatively. We show that even if more general partition
reductions are used, in which the n parties are partitioned into k sets (2 • k • n ¡ 1) rather than
just two, those reductions are still too weak to characterize privacy. On the other hand, we show that
increasing the number of sets k does give some extra characterization power. C° 2001 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
A set of n parties, each holding an input value xi from some domain Xi , wishes to distributively
compute a given function f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn). The participants communicate via a complete network
of reliable and secure channels (no eavesdropping). The participants are honest—they send messages
according to the prescribed randomized protocol for f . However, a subset of the participants (a coalition)
might get together after the execution of the protocol in an attempt to infer additional information on
the inputs of non-coalition parties. Additional information is any information that does not follow from
the value of the function, f (Ex), and the inputs of the coalition parties. A protocol F is called t-private
if no coalition containing at most t parties can get any additional information from F’s execution.
Private multiparty computation of general functions, under various models and assumptions, has been
the subject of a considerable amount of work, originating from [2, 4, 8, 11]. The model considered here is
a minimalistic one, referred to as the model of “honest but curious” parties, in the information-theoretic
setting. Stronger adversarial scenarios, including Byzantine [2, 4] and adaptive [3] adversaries, have
been studied in the literature. Negative results on private computation in our model hold in the more
adversarial (information-theoretic) models as well.
The seminal works of [2, 4] showed that all n-argument functions over finite domains Xi can be
computed b n¡12 c-privately. In [5] it is shown that there exists a dense privacy hierarchy: for any b n¡12 c •
t • n ¡ 2 there exists an n-argument function which is t-private (i.e., can be computed by a t-private
protocol) but is not (t C 1)-private. In the works of [1, 10] a complete characterization of 1-private
two-argument functions is given. The general question of characterizing the class of t-private functions
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of n-argument, for any n ‚ 3 and d n2 e • t • n ¡ 1, is still open. The only technique which appears
in the literature for proving non-t-privacy of functions with n ‚ 3 arguments uses a reduction to the
two-party case, via a partition argument [5–7]. If f is t-private, where d n2 e • t • n ¡ 1, then for every
partition (S; ¯S) of the parties f1; 2; : : : ; ng such that jSj; j ¯Sj • t , the two-argument function obtained
by viewing f as a function of fxi gi2S and fxi gi2 ¯S is 1-private.
In [6], in the course of proving a characterization of t-private Boolean functions, it is shown that,
with respect to Boolean functions, such a partition argument always suffices for proving non-t-privacy.
That is, for any n-argument Boolean function which is not t-private, there exists a suitable partition of
its variables into two sets such that the induced two-argument function is not 1-private. A similar result
holds for a certain class of symmetric functions [7]. The question whether such an argument always
suffices for proving non-t-privacy in the general case is raised as an open problem in [5, 7], where
extensive use of the partition technique has been made.
In this work we provide a negative answer to this question: partitions cannot always be used to prove
non-privacy. The proof starts in Section 4, where we give a necessary condition for the (n¡1)-privacy of
any n-argument function that generalizes the necessary (and sufficient) condition of the two-party case.
This result opens up the possibility of proving non-privacy of an n-argument function by partitioning its
variables into k > 2 sets and using the k-party necessary condition to show that the induced k-argument
function is not private.
Now how powerful are those generalized partition arguments? Is it possible that their use together with
a characterization of all private k-argument functions, where k is bounded by some fixed K , is universal
for non-privacy proofs? Section 5 addresses these questions. We show that the power of generalized
partition arguments is in fact rather limited. We construct an n-argument function gn which is not fully
private (i.e., not (n ¡ 1)-private), but every nontrivial partition of its variables induces a fully private
function. Putting it in another way, the non-privacy of gn is very “fragile.” It collapses whenever any
two (or more) of the parties unite. This means that the non-privacy of gn cannot be reduced via partition
arguments to the non-privacy of some function of k < n variables. On the other hand, we show that
increasing the number of sets in partitions does give some extra power. For any k ‚ 3 we construct n-
argument functions (n > k) which, for some t < n¡1, can be proven to be non-t-private using partition
into k sets, but cannot be proven to be non-t-private using partition into a smaller number of sets.
2. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we define the model of distributed computation that is used, give a formal definition
of privacy in this model, and introduce some notation.
The system consists of a complete synchronous network of n honest parties P1; P2; : : : ; Pn with
secure and reliable point-to-point communication (no eavesdropping). (By saying that the parties are
honest it is meant that they send messages according to a predetermined protocol F .) At the beginning
of an execution, each party Pi has an input xi 2 Xi (no probability space is associated with the inputs).
In addition, each party has a random independent input ri taken from a source of randomness Ri . The
parties wish to compute some given function f (Ex). To this end, they exchange messages as prescribed
by the protocol F . Messages are sent in rounds, where in each round every party can send a message to
every other party. The protocol’s definition determines which message a party sends in the kth round as
a function of its input, its random input, the messages it received so far, and the identity of the receiver.
At the end of the computation, one of the parties (say P1) outputs the value f (Ex).
The communication passed in the network when the parties have inputs Ex and random inputs Er is
denoted EC(Ex; Er ) and is represented by a vector of strings, whose kth entry includes the concatenation
of all messages sent during kth round of the execution of the protocol, parsed according to sender and
receiver. For a given communication EC and a subset T of the n parties, ECT denotes the restriction of EC to
the messages sent or received by the parties in T (i.e., ECT excludes from EC all messages sent internally
between the parties of T ).
Let F be a randomized protocol which computes f (Ex) (with no error). We say that a coalition (i.e.,
a set of parties) T does not learn any additional information from the execution of F (other than what
follows from its input and f (Ex)) if the following holds: For every two inputs Ex; Ey that agree in their T
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entries (i.e., 8i 2 T : xi D yi ) and satisfy f (Ex) D f (Ey), and for every choice of random inputs fri gi2T ,
the messages seen by T are identically distributed. That is, for every communication EC ,
Pr ( ECT j Ex; fri gi2T ) D Pr ( ECT j Ey; fri gi2T );
where the probability space is over all random inputs in T , namely fri gi2 ¯T (each ri is distributed
according to Ri and they are all independent). We say that F is t-private if any coalition T , which
contains at most t parties, does not learn any additional information from the execution of the protocol
F . We say that a function f is t-private if there exists a t-private protocol computing f . We say that
the n-argument function f is fully private if it is (n ¡ 1)-private.
3. PROVING NON-PRIVACY VIA PARTITION ARGUMENTS
In this section we state the Partition Lemma, which allows the reduction of proving the non-privacy
of an n-argument function f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) to proving the non-privacy of a k-argument function
f 0(y1; y2; : : : ; yk)(k < n). Previous works [5–7], relying only on the two-party characterization of
privacy, restrict the statement of the lemma to the case where k D 2. The following more general form
is an immediate generalization of the special case used in those works.
DEFINITION 3.1. A k-partition of a set of n parties (or variables) f1; 2; : : : ; ng is an ordered partition
of the set into k non-empty, mutually disjoint sets and is denoted (S1; S2; : : : ; Sk).
DEFINITION 3.2. Given an n-argument function f : X1 £ X2 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ Xn ! Z and a k-partition
(S1; S2; : : : ; Sk) of the parties, denote by Yi the Cartesian product of the X j with j 2 Si , and let
f 0 : Y1 £ Y2 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ Yk ! Z be the function obtained by viewing f as a k-argument function;
that is, f 0 is defined by f 0(fxi gi2S1 ; fxi gi2S2 ; : : : ; fxi gi2Sk ) D f (x1; x2; : : : ; xn). Given an n-argument
function f , the k-argument function f 0 will be referred to as the function induced by the partition (S1;
S2; : : : ; Sk).
LEMMA 3.1 (The Partition Lemma [6]). Suppose f : X1 £ X2 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ Xn ! Z is t-private. Then
for every k-partition 5 D (S1; S2; : : : ; Sk) and every t 0 such that the size of the union of any t 0 sets Si
does not exceed t; the induced k-argument function f 0 is t 0-private.
We remark that the cases of interest in the above lemma are t ‚ d n2 e and t 0 ‚ d k2e. The simple
proof of the lemma is by direct simulation: an original t-private n-party protocol may be simulated
by the k parties, where each “new” party P 0i takes the role of all original parties belonging to Si ,
embedding internal communications into the definition of the new protocol. The t 0-privacy of the new
protocol follows from the t-privacy of the original protocol and from the sizes of coalitions induced
by 5.
Note that in using partition reductions to prove the non-t-privacy of some n-argument function, the
cardinality k of the partitions can be restricted to range from 2 to n ¡ 1. If k D 1, then the induced
function is always fully private (as a 1-argument function), so non-privacy cannot be proven at all. If
k D n, on the other hand, then the original problem is reduced to itself, which is not much of a help
either.
4. NECESSARY CONDITION FOR FULL PRIVACY
In this section we state and prove a necessary condition for the full privacy of any n-argument function.
This condition generalizes the necessary condition for the two-party case [1, 10].
In order to simplify (and clarify) the statement and proof of the following lemma, we do not use
the most general form possible. We restrict our attention to functions mapping from [m]n (where [m]
denotes the set f1; 2; : : : ;mg) into some arbitrary range Z . The lemma can be applied to functions
of arbitrary (even infinite) domains and further strengthened using a generalization of the concept of
“forbidden rectangle” from [10] to the multiparty case.
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x1 x2 x3 g(Ex)
* 1 1 1
2 * 2 2
3 3 * 3
any other Ex Ex
FIG. 1. The function g.
DEFINITION 4.1. Given a vector Eu 2 [m]n and d 2 [m], denote by Eujiˆd the vector obtained by
replacing the value of the ith coordinate of Eu with d. A function f : [m]n ! Z is called non-separable
at its ith coordinate if there exists a vector Eu, such that f attains the same value on all m vectors
Eujiˆd ; 1 • d • m. The function f is called non-separable if it is non-separable at each of its n
coordinates.
Any constant function is clearly non-separable. As a less trivial example, Fig. 1 describes a spe-
cific function g, whose domain is [3]3. This function is nonseparable, as g(1; 1; 1) D g(2; 1; 1) D
g(3; 1; 1); g(2; 1; 2) D g(2; 2; 2) D g(2; 3; 2), and g(3; 3; 1) D g(3; 3; 2) D g(3; 3; 3).
LEEMA 4.1. If f : [m]n ! Z is a non-constant non-separable function; then f is not fully private.
Proof. The following proof generalizes the proof for the two-party case appearing in [10]. Suppose
toward a contradiction thatF is an (n¡1)-private protocol which computes f . We may assume, without
loss of generality, that the parties “take turns” in sending messages; i.e., party Pi gets to send messages
only in rounds i C nj; j D 0; 1; 2; : : : .
PROPOSITION 4.1. For every two inputs Ex; Ey 2 [m]n and communication EC; Pr ( EC j Ex) D Pr ( EC j Ey)
(where the probabilities here and in the following proof are taken over the choices of all random inputs).
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is simple: In each round, if the active party Pi has no informa-
tion on the inputs of the other parties, the distribution of the messages it sends should not depend on its
input. Because otherwise, the nonseparability of f at the i th coordinate implies that for some possible
combination of the other parties’ inputs, the coalition of all other parties will violate the privacy of
Pi . Since initially no party has any information on the other parties’ inputs, this condition is preserved
throughout the execution of the protocol. This argument applies to the final round as well, forcing errors
in the final output. We now formalize this idea.
Let EC be any communication vector, and let ECk denote the restriction of EC to its first k entries (i.e.,ECk includes all messages of EC sent during the first k rounds). Let Ck denote the restriction of EC to its
kth entry alone. We prove, by induction on k, that for any two inputs Ex; Ey; Pr ( ECk j Ex) D Pr ( ECk j Ey).
The case of k D 0 is trivial (both probabilities are 1). We now assume that the claim holds for k ¡ 1
and prove that it holds for k. Assume that Pi is the active party in the kth round. By the inductive
assumption, Pr ( ECk¡1 j Ez ) is independent of the input Ez. If this probability is 0, then also Pr ( ECk j Ex) D
Pr ( ECk j Ey) D 0. We may thus assume from now on that (for all inputs Ez) Pr ( ECk¡1 j Ez) > 0.
Let Ex; Ey be any two input vectors, and Eu; Ev be two vectors such that ui D xi ; vi D yi , for all j
other than i; u j D v j , and f (Eu) D f (Ev) (the existence of such Eu; Ev is guaranteed by the assumption
that f is nonseparable). For any communication EC , the combined view of a coalition, consisting of all
parties except Pi , includes all messages of EC . Thus, the requirement that F is (n ¡ 1)-private implies
that Pr ( EC j Eu) D Pr ( EC j Ev). Since this is true for any communication EC , we have in particular that
Pr (Ck j Eu; ECk¡1) D Pr (Ck j Ev; ECk¡1) (note that Pr ( ECk¡1) > 0 by an assumption made earlier).
Relying on the fact4 that for any Ez the probability Pr (Ck j Ez; ECk¡1) depends only on zi , the input of
the i th party, we have that
Pr (Ck j Ex; ECk¡1) D Pr (Ck j Eu; ECk¡1)
D Pr (Ck j Ev; ECk¡1)
D Pr (Ck j Ey; ECk¡1);
4 A formal proof of this basic property of general randomized protocols appears in [9].
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and finally that
Pr ( ECk j Ex) D Pr (Ck j Ex; ECk¡1)Pr ( ECk¡1 j Ex)
D Pr (Ck j Ey; ECk¡1)Pr ( ECk¡1 j Ey)
D Pr ( ECk j Ey);
as required.
In particular we conclude that the distribution of messages sent in the final round of F , which are
assumed to contain the value of f , is the same for every input. Since f is non-constant, this contradicts
the requirement that F computes f (even if we allow the protocol to err with some positive probability
smaller than 12 ). This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Remark. The converse of Lemma 4.1 does not hold; this necessary condition is not sufficient for
full privacy.5 For instance, consider the function f : f0; 1g3 ! f0; 1g3 [ f1g such that f (Ex) equals 1
for Ex D 000; 110; 001 and equals Ex otherwise. The function f can be shown to be not fully private via
a partition argument,6 but is clearly not non-separable.
5. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we prove two results, both dealing with the power of partition reductions. The first
(and more significant) shows that this power is rather limited: partitions cannot always be used to prove
non-privacy. The second result shows that while this power is limited, it gradually increases as the
number of sets in partitions is allowed to grow. Both results can be obtained as special cases of the
following lemma.
LEMMA 5.1. Let k ‚ 3; ‘ ‚ 1 be two integers. There exists a k‘-argument function fk;‘ for which
there is some k-partition inducing a k-argument function which is not fully private; but for every k 0 < k;
all k 0-partitions induce fully private k 0-argument functions.
Proof. Set n D k‘. Define k sets Di as follows: D1 D f1; 2; : : : ; ‘g; D2 D f‘C 1; ‘C 2; : : : ; 2‘g;
: : : ; Dk D fn ¡ ‘ C 1; n ¡ ‘ C 2; : : : ; ng, and let di denote the minimal element of Di . Define an
n-argument function fk;‘ : [k]n ! [k] [ [k]n as follows: If there exists i 2 [k] such that for all j
in [n]nDi ; x j D i (since k ‚ 2 there can be at most one such i), then let fk;‘(Ex) D i ; otherwise let
fk;‘(Ex) D Ex . Note that for any i 2 [k], whether fk;‘(Ex) D i depends only on the values assigned to
the variables in [n]nDi . The instance f3;2 is described in Fig. 2. We show that such an fk;‘ meets the
requirements of Lemma 5.1.
PROPOSITION 5.1. There exists a k-partition of the n variables inducing a k-argument function which
is not fully private.
Proof. The k-partition (D1; D2; : : : ; Dk) induces a k-argument function f 0 which is both non-
constant and non-separable. (Non-separability at the ith coordinate follows from the “all i” input vector.)
By Lemma 4.1, f 0 is not fully private.
PROPOSITION 5.2. For every k 0 < k; every k 0-partition of the n variables induces a fully private
k 0-argument function.
Proof. Let 5 D (S1; S2; : : : ; Sk 0 ) be a k 0-partition of the n D k‘ variables. Since k 0 < k there must
be some set Si 2 5whose size is greater than ‘, so without loss of generality we assume jS1j > ‘. Define
A D fh : S1 \ Dh 6D ;g. Since jS1j > ‘, the set A must contain at least two elements.7 In other words,
5 A slightly generalized formulation of the non-separability condition, as is done for the two-party case in [1, 10] would
make it sufficient for two-party privacy; however, the three-argument function defined below is not non-separable even under the
generalized condition.
6 The two-argument function induced by the partition (f1, 2g, f3g) contains an “embedded OR” (cf. [10]), and hence, by the
two-party characterization, it is not private.
7 The set A depends on the partition 5 and does not depend on the actual input Ex .
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 f3;2(Ex)
* * 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 * * 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 * * 3
any other Ex Ex
FIG. 2. The function f3;2.
party P1 holds inputs with indices in at least two different sets Di . Denote by f the function induced
by the partition 5. We describe a (deterministic) fully private protocol F computing f , in which each
party Pi ; 1 • i • k 0, holds the input variables with indices in Si . Intuitively, the protocol will specify a
“cautious” sequence of partial disclosures of information, guaranteeing that the information disclosed
in any execution can be inferred from the value f (Ex).
Protocol F :
Round 1: P1 finds the set R ‰ f1; 2; : : : ; kg of all values j 0 such that P1’s inputs rule out the
possibility that f (Ex) D j 0. It then announces a value a 2 R, which is determined as follows:
1. If jAj > 2 or A µ R, then a is the minimal element in R. (Proof of correctness will show
that R is nonempty.)
2. Otherwise, a is the minimal element in RnA. (Proof of correctness will show that in this
case RnA is nonempty.)
Round 2: The party holding input variable xda (the element with minimal index in Da) announces
its value, b.
Round 3: Parties announce the values of all variables with indices from [n]nDb (i.e., each party Pi
announces the values of the variables x j such that j 2 Si \ ([n]nDb)).
Round 4: If all variables revealed in the previous round are equal to b; P1 outputs “ f D b,” and
the protocol terminates. Otherwise all parties announce the values of all variables not yet revealed.
Round 5: P1, knowing all inputs, outputs “ f D Ex .”
We now prove that F computes f correctly and with full privacy.
Correctness: We first show that the choice of a in Round 1 is well defined. As illustrated by Fig. 2,
each input value xi is consistent with at most two values for f taken from [k], namely either f D xi or
f D j , where i 2 D j . Since k ‚ 3 it follows that P1 can rule out at least one value a 2 [k] from being
equal to f (Ex), and so R is always nonempty. In order to prove that the choice of a is well defined in the
second case of Round 1 as well, it suffices to show that if RnA is empty then the first case must hold.
Suppose that jAj D 2 (otherwise the first case obviously holds) and RnA D ;. Since k ‚ 3, there exists
some j0 2 [k]nA, and such j0 cannot be in R (otherwise RnA would be nonempty). By the definition
of f , all variables held by P1 must be equal to j0. Since j0 =2 A, this implies that each j 0 2 A can be
ruled out from being equal to the value of f . It follows that A µ R, and the first case holds.
The protocol always terminates with an output. We will show that this output is indeed equal to the
value of f . Since f (Ex) 6D a, and xda D b, when the protocol reaches Round 4 it must be the case that
f (Ex) is either b or Ex . Now, if “ f D b” is output in Round 4, this must be because xi D b for all i =2 Db,
and so by definition of fk;‘ we have f (Ex) D b. If xi 6D b for some i =2 Db then by definition f (Ex) D Ex ,
so the value of f output in Round 5 is correct.
Privacy: By the definition of full privacy, it suffices to show that for every j 2 [k] the protocol yields
identical messages when run on all inputs Ex such that f (Ex) D j . (Inputs such that f (Ex) D Ex impose no
privacy constraint.) Suppose f (Ex) D j , where j 2 [k]. By the protocol, the value of a announced by
P1 in Round 1 depends on R. So it may seem that this message could reveal some information on P1’s
inputs. We will begin by showing that (given the fixed k 0-partition 5 and the set A associated with it)
the value of a chosen in Round 1 depends only on j . This implies that the Round 1 message does not
violate the privacy requirements.
Case 1. jAj > 2. Since A contains at least three elements, then for every j 0 2 [k]nf jg; P1 holds
some input variable xi whose index i satisfies i =2 D j [ D j 0 . Since f (Ex) D j , the value of such xi must
equal j . This allows P1 to rule out the possibility that f (Ex) D j 0. It follows that in this case R D [k]nf jg.
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Case 2. jAj D 2 and j 2 A. In this case j 2 AnR, so A 6µ R and P1 acts according to the
second case in Round 1. Let A D f j; ˜jg. Then P1 holds some input variable xi whose index i satisfies
i 2 D ˜j . By the definition of f , since f (Ex) D j , the equality xi D j must hold. Therefore, for every
j 0 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kgnA, the inputs held by P1 rule out the possibility that f (Ex) D j 0. It follows that in this
case RnA D [k]nA, implying that a D min([k]nA).
Case 3. jAj D 2 and j =2 A. Let A D f j1; j2g, then P1 holds two input variables xi1 ; xi2 whose
indices i1; i2 satisfy i1 2 D j1 ; i2 2 D j2 . By the definition of f , since f (Ex) D j , the equality xi1 D xi2 D j
must hold. Therefore, for both elements of A, the inputs held by P1 rule out the possibility that the value
of f equals this element. This means that A µ R and P1 acts according to the first case in Round 1. As
A contains two elements from [k] that are different than j , the same reasoning as that in Case 1 implies
that in this case R D [k]nf jg.
Now whether Case 1, 2, or 3 holds is completely determined by A and j , the value of f . Given each
case, the value a is again determined by A and j . Therefore the value a sent by P1 at Round 1 does not
violate the privacy requirements.
It can be easily verified that for any Ex with f (Ex) D j , the value of all messages sent in rounds 2–4 is
equal to j ; these messages are sent by the same set of parties, and the protocol terminates at Round 4.
This establishes the full privacy of F .
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 directly imply Lemma 5.1.
We can now prove the two main results.
THEOREM 5.1. The converse of the Partition Lemma does not hold. More specifically; for every n ‚ 3
there exists an n-argument function gn which is not fully private; but every k-partition of its variables
to fewer than n parts (2 • k • n ¡ 1) induces a fully private function.
Proof. Define gn D fn;1 (Fig. 1 describes the instance g3). Lemma 5.1 implies that gn (as the function
induced by its own n-partition) is not fully private, but every k-partition of its variables, 2 • k • n¡ 1,
induces a fully private function.
THEOREM 5.2. The power of partition reductions strictly increases as the number of sets in the
partitions is allowed to grow. More formally; for any k ‚ 3 there exist n-argument functions (n > k)
which; for some t; can be proven to be non-t-private using partition into k sets; but cannot be proven
to be non-t-private using partition into a smaller number of sets.
Proof. Set f D fk;‘, where ‘ ‚ 2. The proof of Proposition 5.1 exhibits a partition of the k‘
variables of f into k sets of size ‘ each, such that the induced k-argument function is not (k¡1)-private.
Since each union of k¡ 1 sets from this partition is of size (k¡ 1)‘, the Partition Lemma implies that f
is not (k¡ 1)‘-private. In addition, Lemma 5.1 states that for every k 0 < k, all k 0-partitions induce fully
private functions, and thus such partitions cannot be used to prove non-privacy of fk;‘. We conclude
that such f satisfies the requirements of Theorem 5.2 with n D k‘ and t D (k ¡ 1)‘ D (1¡ 1k )n.
6. OPEN PROBLEMS
As indicated by Theorem 5.2, the combination of a generalized Partition Lemma with our necessary
condition for full privacy is stronger than the combination of two-partitions and the two-party characteri-
zation, used in previous works [5–7]. This gives hope to characterize wider natural classes of functions
using the generalized techniques.
The general problem of characterizing the t-private functions is still wide open. Our necessary
condition for full privacy is not a sufficient one, and this leaves even the problem of characterizing full
privacy open. To gain better understanding of the information-theoretic notion of privacy, one has to
develop new proof techniques for proving non-t-privacy, especially when t < n ¡ 1.
Finally, while this work focuses on existential results, a potentially interesting question is that of
finding the maximal range size M , such that partition reductions are universal for proving non-privacy
of functions mapping to [M]. The Boolean case characterization of [6] shows that such maximal M is
it least 2. Is this bound tight?
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